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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
creates a reasonable doubt as to his mental capacity is also un-
satisfactory. This rule treats sanity as a part of the criminal
intent, or mens rea, and thus as a necessary element of the
crime. However, mental capacity and criminal intent, as a gen-
eral rule, are not one and the same thing.'8 Criminal intent
involves the question of whether the defendant actively desired
(specific intent) or could be expected to know (general intent)
that certain consequences would result from his act, whereas
the test of insanity as applied in Louisiana and other jurisdic-
tions essentially deals with whether the defendant appreciated
the wrongness of his conduct. The existence of insanity should
only be considered as an affirmative defense for urging the lack
of criminal responsibility when both the facts relative to the
commission of the proscribed conduct and the requisite intent
element have been established. 19 In addition, as a practical mat-
ter the second rule is preferable to the third because the latter
disregards the presumption of sanity and places the burden on
the state to establish the defendant's sanity after only "some evi-
dence" 20 of insanity has been presented by the defense. 21 In
effect the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the mental condition of the defendant was in fact that
which society initially presumed it to be. Also, the defendant
is certainly in a better position to prove his insanity than is the
state to prove his sanity.
Bernard E. Boudreaux, Jr.
CRIMINAL LAW - THE FELONY MANSLAUGHTER DOCTRINE
IN LOUISIANA
Defendant attempted to kill a bartender with a knife and the
bartender fired a pistol in self-defense. The bullet from the
pistol struck and killed a customer sitting at the bar. Defendant
18. It would seem that the only instance in which insanity should be treated
as an element of the crime is, as in voluntary intoxication, where its presence
precludes the possibility of any intent. Generally, voluntary intoxication is no
defense, but it may preclude the presence of a specific intent or knowledge, which
is an element of a crime, when the defendant is so intoxicated that he could not
possibly desire or know that certain consequences will result from his act.
Similarly, if the defendant is so insane that he cannot desire or know that certain
consequences will result from his act, then he lacks criminal intent. However, this
insanity must be an extreme case, possibly bordering on the old wild beast classi-
fication. Practically, such a person will not be brought to trial, and this excep-
tion is more in the realm of theoretical speculation than in reality.
19. State v. Surrency, 148 La. 983, 88 So. 240 (1921).
20. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491(2) (3d ed. 1940).
21. Id. §§ 2485-2491, 2497.
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was indicted for manslaughter under a statute which provides
that a killing while the offender is committing or attempting to
commit a misdemeanor directly affecting the person or a felony
not enumerated in the murder article is manslaughter.1 The trial
judge sustained a motion to quash the indictment and discharged
the defendant. On appeal the Louisiana Supreme Court held, af-
firmed. Since the word "offender" means "actual killer," the de-
fendant felon could not be indicted for manslaughter where the
fatal injury was inflicted by a weapon in the hands of one re-
sisting the felony. 2 State v. Garner, 238 La. 563, 115 So.2d 855
(1959).
The Louisiana Criminal Code provides that a killing "when
the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted per-
petration" of certain dangerous felonies is murder even though
he had no intent to kill. 3 If the crime accompanying the homicide
is any other felony, or a misdemeanor directly affecting the per-
son, the criminal is chargeable with manslaughter.
4
The extent to which a killing must be connected with a felony
in order for the felony murder doctrine to apply has presented
a serious question in jurisdictions adhering to a felony murder
rule. A difficult problem within this area arises when the lethal
injury is inflicted by an instrumentality in the hands of one at-
tempting to resist or prevent the crime.5 Prior to the instant
case the question of liability in such a situation had not arisen
in Louisiana, and since the Louisiana felony manslaughter and
murder provisions have their bases in the common law, 6 it is
appropriate to see how common law courts have handled this
problem.
1. LA. R.S. 14:31 (1950) provides that "Manslaughter is ... (2) A homicide
committed, without any intent to cause death or great bodily harm. (a) When
the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any felony
not enumerated in Article 30, or of any intentional misdemeanor directly affecting
the person .. "
2. The accompanying felony in the instant case was attempted murder.
3. LA. R.S. 14:30 (2) (1950).
4. Id. 14:31(2) (a).
5. See generally CLARK & MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES
§ 10.07 (6th ed. 1958) ; Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of
Others, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 50 (1956).
6. Under the common law felony murder rule one who unintentionally killed
another while committing or attempting to commit a felony was guilty of murder.
The rule was based on the idea that the malicious state of mind of a person
committing a felony should be said to make any death stemming from his crime
a killing with malice aforethought, and, hence, murder. CLARK & MARSHALL, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 10.07 (6th ed. 1958). Louisiana, along with
some other American jurisdictions, has mitigated the harshness of this doctrine to
some extent by making the homicide only manslaughter unless the accompanying
felony is highly dangerous to life.
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Some of the cases dealing with this problem use what is
known as the "act or constructive act" rule, while others use the
"proximate cause" rule. Though favoring the "act or construc-
tive act" rule generally, some courts have held it to be not ap-
plicable, and the defendant responsible, in a special factual situa-
tion which has come to be called a "shield" case.
According to the "act or constructive act" rule, one cannot be
held responsible for a homicide attending a felony unless the
fatal act was actually or constructively his own and it cannot be
constructively his unless done by someone acting in concert with
him or in furtherance of a common purpose. From this it follows
that a felon could not be held for a homicide accompanying his
crime if the fatal injury was inflicted by a weapon in the hands
of someone resisting the felony.7
The "proximate cause" theory holds the felon for all deaths
of which the felony was a "proximate cause." The most striking
applications of this theory have been in cases involving armed
robberies, where it has been held that the robbers were respon-
sible for the death of a victim of the robbery even if he was acci-
dentally shot by another victim," and for the fatal shooting of
one policeman by another officer engaged in a gun battle with
the robbers.9 The deaths were held to have been "proximately
caused" by the robberies because the defendants began a chain
of events which had as reasonably foreseeable consequences such
killings as actually occurred.
The "shield" cases draw the line of liability between that
7. Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1.085 (1.905) (robbers were
not guilty of murder where the victim, shooting in self-defense, accidentally killed
an innocent bystander). See also Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541
(1863) (participant in a riot not guilty of manslaughter if the shot which killed
an innocent person was not fired by a rioter) ; State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658,
122 S.E. 568 (1924) (one carrying out a conspiracy to assault and batter another
not guilty of manslaughter if the shot which killed an innocent person was fired
in self-defense by the victim of the assault and battery).
8. People v. Payne, 359 Ill. 246, 194 N.E. 539 (1935) reached this result. See
also Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947), where the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated (in a passage that the court later, in Com-
monwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958), maintained was dicta)
that robbers could be held for first degree murder even if the shot which killed a
filling station attendant had been fired by the owner of the station in his attempt
to prevent the robbery. Robbers and burglars, said the court, should know that
their crimes invite dangerous resistance of which the death of some person at the
hands of a resister is a reasonably foreseeable consequnce. Hence the crime is a
"proximate cause" of such a death. This has been the rationale of the cases apply-
ing this rule.
9. People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201 (1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 845 (1952) ; Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595
(1949) (off-duty policeman who grabbed a fleeing robber was killed).
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imposed by a rigid adherence to one or the other of the two
rules previously examined. A "shield" situation arises when the
defendants force the deceased into a position where there is
great danger of his death at the hands of one resisting the felony.
A good example of this is an Arkansas case where robbers
escaping from a bank forced a teller to accompany them and
the teller was shot by the town marshall. 10 Even courts which
ordinarily favor the "act or constructive act" rule have held that
under such circumstances the defendant is responsible for the
homicide." In this case the Arkansas Supreme Court held the
robbers guilty of murder, emphasizing the fact that they forced
the deceased into a dangerous position and so caused his death.
In the instant case the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed
authority supporting both the "act or constructive act" and the
"proximate cause" rules in an attempt to determine the intended
meaning of Louisiana's felony manslaughter statute. The court
based its finding of no liability on the ground that criminal
statutes should be construed "strictly.' '1 2 Thus the word "of-
fender" in the statute was held to have been intended to mean
"actual killer."
The problem of how close a connexity will be required be-
tween the felony and homicide for application of the felony
murder or felony manslaughter rules is essentially one of public
policy. The "proximate cause" idea is apparently based on a
belief that the result achieved protects the public by deterring
some potential felons and eliminating some dangerous felons
from circulation. This rule is also probably based to some extent
on a desire for just retribution. Critics of the "proximate cause"
rule point out that the effectiveness of the felony murder doc-
trine as a deterrent is doubtful, since it comes into play in only
a small number of cases. The "proximate cause" rule subjects
the defendant to an admittedly harsh punishment and probably
has no substantial deterrent effect upon would-be felons. A re-
cent Pennsylvania case, 13 later overruled, 4 which held that one
10. Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100 (1934).
11. Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 564, 55 S.W. 961 (1900) (train robber who
forced fireman to accompany him to express car could be convicted of murder if
a bullet fired at the robber by one of the passengers killed the fireman).
12. See Note, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 600 (1960).
13. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955).
14. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958) expressly
overruled the Thomas case and specifically reserved the question of the validity
of the Aimeida decision (362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949)) for a later case, thus
casting some doubt on the applicability of the "proximate cause" rule in Penn-
sylvania. Redine and Thomas were distinguished from Almeida on the technical
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robber could be guilty of murder when his partner in the crime
was killed by their victim, shows what hard results a court
thinking in terms of "proximate cause" may reach. In the
writer's opinion the "act or constructive act" rule furnishes
adequate protection to the public and is the wiser rule for a case
that does not fall into the "shield" category.
Now that the instant case has been added to Louisiana juris-
prudence, the result reached in subsequent cases in Louisiana
should be the same as that reached by a common law court fol-
lowing the "act or constructive act" rule.15 The case does not,
however, make clear what result would be reached in a "shield"
situation. It might be logically held that a felon who inten-
tionally forced an innocent person into a position where there
was a high danger of his death at the hand of one resisting the
felony was as much an "actual killer" as was the person who
inflicted the lethal injury. Considerations of social policy would-
seem to dictate such a conclusion.
Robert Butler III
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE- VENUE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
PROSECUTING PARISH
Defendant, a member of the Board of Commissioners of the
Pontchartrain Levee District, which is domiciled in St. James
Parish, was indicted for public bribery' in that parish. Upon a
stipulation of facts by the district attorney admitting that no
offer, acceptance, receipt, or deposit of anything of value was
made in the parish, the defense moved to quash the information
because of improper venue. It was argued that the offense was
not committed in St. James Parish and, moreover, that the pro-
ground that the killing of an escaping robber by his victim or a police officer
was "justifiable," while the accidental killing of one policeman by another engaged
in a gun battle with robbers was "excusable." This seems a poor basis for dis-
tinction. The court might have done better to hold the felony murder rule not
applicable to a case where the deceased was a felon, justifying this conclusion
on the ground that the doctrine developed as a means of protecting the innocent
public.
15. If the defendant inflicts the fatal injury himself, he is covered by the
phrase "actual killer." If his accomplice does the killing, he can still be held for
the homicide under LA. R.S. 14:24 (1950). It should be noted that the phrase
"when the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration"
appears in both the murder and manslaughter articles, so the result reached in
the instant case should also be reached in a murder case.
1. LA. R.S. 14:118 (1950) provides that the "acceptance of, or the offer to
accept, directly or indirectly, anything of apparent present or prospective value
[from named persons with the intent to influence the person's conduct in relation
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